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The Constitutionality of Labor

Unions' Collection and Use of
Forced Dues for Non-Bargaining
Purposes
By Hugh L. Reilly*

I. EARLY CASES
In 1977, the Supreme Court considered whether the first amendment
prevents or limits forced union dues in the public sector. The issue arose
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.1 The Court's decision resolved
several important issues, some unexpectedly, and left others for subsequent litigation. The Court rejected the claim that forced dues for publicsector employees are per se unconstitutional.2 Instead, the Court determined that such fees are constitutional, but only to the extent that they
defray the union's cost of "collective bargaining, contract administration,
and grievance adjustment." s In the Court's view, a fee confined to the
cost of those three activities is constitutionally permissible because an
"important" governmental interest exists "to distribute fairly the cost of
these activities. . . ."' In its discussion of this issue, the Court appears to
have applied the "overbreadth-least restrictive alternative" test, a traditional type of first amendment analysis.'
The decision relies heavily upon past private-sector cases that decide
similar issues. In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,6 the Court
* Staff Attorney; National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield,
Virginia. American University (B.A., 1961); American University (LL.B., 1964).
1. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
2. Id. at 226.
3. Id. at 225-226.
4. Id. at 222.
5. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972).
6. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). The Court in Hanson said: "The financial support required relates. . . to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining .... If'assessments'
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held that "the requirement for financial support of the collective-bargain-

ing agency by all who receive the benefits of its work.. . does not violate
either the First or the Fifth Amendments." 7 Similarly, in International
Association of Machinists v. Street,s the Court found that the use of dues

"to support candidates for public office, and advance political programs,
is not a use which helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or admin-

istration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes." Abood, Hanson, and Street establish,
either by first amendment analysis or statutory construction, that both

public and private employees are protected from the union's non-collective-bargaining use of their fees.

The definition of chargeable costs that emerged from Hanson and
Street was based upon statutory construction. However, it was a construction forced by the constitutional difficulties evident in requiring employees to support any union activities.10 Until Abood was decided, there

was an open and debated question as to whether the first amendment
itself prevented or imposed limits upon forced dues obtained by unions
from private-sector employees, or whether such employees had only a
statutory claim." Answering those who perceived an operative difference
between the rights of employees on this issue, the Court in Abood held

that the rights in each sector are the same."
Although this per se equation of employee rights in both sectors is his-

are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to collective bargaining, a different problem
would be presented." Id. at 235.
7. Id. at 238.
8. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
9. Id. at 768.
10. "The position taken by the Court in Hanson [and) Street... is strong medicine. It
is not equivocal. Indeed, it contains constitutional overtones which appear to be foregone
only by use of statutory construction to avoid First and Fifth Amendment issues." Seay v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 1970).
11. Illustrative of the controversy is the sequence of decisions in Evans v. American
Fed'n of Tel. & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Buckley v.
American Fed'n of Tel. & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1975).
Especially noteworthy is the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, who would have granted certiorari, for the following reasons among others:
When Congress authorizes an employer and union to enter into union shop agreements and makes such agreements binding and enforceable over the dissents of a
minority of employees or union members, it has cast the weight of the Federal
Government behind the agreements just as surely as if it had imposed them by
statute. 419 U.S. at 1095.
12. "The differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do
not translate into differences in First Amendment rights." 431 U.S. at 232. See Id. at 229-30.
See also Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 87 (D. Md. 1979); Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D.
Md. 1979). These two decisions of the District Court of Maryland involved the first privatesector case to explicitly follow Abood and so hold.
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torically sound,'1 the Court does not offer any supporting explanation.
Traditional analysis posits that the Constitution establishes the powers
and limitations upon powers of government.1' Conversely, it is held that
the Constitution, without more, does not grant or limit the powers of private parties. 15 An all-important caveat to this analysis provides that the
Constitution does operate on private parties if "governmental action" is

involved. 16

As relevant here, "governmental action" is found in at least two areas.

Section 9(a)17 of the National Labor Relations Act' s (hereinafter "the
Act") grants to unions that are "exclusive representatives" the right to
negotiate collective agreements binding upon all employees in a defined
"bargaining unit" overriding even the contrary wishes of employees af-

fected. 19' Section 8(a)(3)' 0 of the Act works with section 8(a)(5)" to re-

quire employers to bargain over, and, as a practical matter, incorporate
terms in those collective agreements which require employees to pay dues
or fees to the union on penalty of employment termination."2 At the same
time, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 prevents employers from exacting an
employee's agreement to refrain from union membership as a condition of
employment." Thus, powers not extended to other private parties are extended by legislation to unions. Further, with respect to the association of
employees with unions, legislation allows otherwise private collective
agreements to require union "membership", or, at least, payments from
employees to unions. In both respects, "governmental action" is apparent,
13. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring);
Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739, 745 (5th Cir. 1955) (Rives, J., dissenting) rev'd
per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
14. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
15. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
16. "Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental poliies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). The
"state action" referred to in Evans is the same as "governmental action."
17. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
18. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935). The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,
1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519. The most recent amendment was Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
All subsequent references will be to "the Act" unless otherwise specified.
19. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
22. See NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
23.
24.

29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
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and constitutional analysis is therefore required. 5
A number of cases subsequent to Abood have been decided in the public sector. They uniformly adopt the "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment" standard of Abood. These cases"
utilize this standard to identify those union costs which can be imposed
upon non-members, irrespective of the language used in collective bargaining agreements or the enabling language used to authorize agency
shop agreements in the several statutes being considered.2 7 This identification process takes place despite general union assertions that the
"everything" they do is collective bargaining.
The question of the relief appropriate in such cases was a prime concern in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen." In that
case the Supreme Court determined that a blanket injunction against collection of full forced dues would be improper, 9 as a denial to the union of
monies to which it was entitled. The Court in Allen suggested, as appropriate relief, a practical decree that would order a refund of past dues and
a reduction of future dues, both for the proportion of dues represented by
non-bargaining expenditures.10 The union that is in possession of the
records has the burden of proof.8 1
In dictum, the Court in Allen suggested the possibility that unions consider a "voluntary" plan as an "internal union remedy" for such claims."
This suggestion was reiterated in Abood." These plans, when promulgated, are commonly referred to as "internal rebate plans." As this label
suggests, these plans contemplate only a post-spending return of monies
25. See Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D. Md. 1979).
26. Greenfield School Comm. v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 3 PuB. BARG. CAB. (CCH)
37,023 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 31, 1980); California School Employees Ass'n v. Bowen, 100
L.R.R.M. 2050 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1978); Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d
607 (1978).
27. Illustrative of the application of the Abood standard by the courts over contrary
statutory language is Greenfield, supra note 26. In that case the statute, MAss. ANN. LAWs
ch. 150E, § 12 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1980), facially provides that non-members pay a
dues-equivalent fee to the union, coupled with the requirement that the union rebate the
costs of a limited number of identified non-bargaining activities. Nevertheless, the court in
Greenfield applied the Abood collective bargaining costs standard.
28. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
29. "And no decree would be proper which appeared likely to infringe the unions' right
to expend uniform exactions under the union-shop agreement in support of activities germane to collective bargaining and, as well, to expend nondissenters' such exactions in support of political activities." Id. at 122.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 431 U.S. at 242. The Court there again emphasized the voluntary character of any
such procedure and expressed no view as to its "constitutional sufficiency."
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and no future relief. Between Allen and Abood, courts held differing
views upon the effect that the existence of such a rebate plan had on
employee claims against the union for non-bargaining spending. In Reid
v. UAW," the court went so far as to hold that the mere existence of a
rebate procedure was, by itself, a defense to a claim brought on a "fair
representation" 5 theory. Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 6 is precisely
to the contrary.
More generally, unions have sought to have the "exhaustion" doctrine
applied to their rebate plan. The claim is that employees with non-bargaining spending claims must first exhaust the rebate before filing suit in
court. Reid declined to address this issue. Two subsequent cases have not
required exhaustion for a variety of reasons,37 while Abood, after remand,
8 In any event, to require exhaustion for claims of this
has required it.3
nature would appear to be contrary to the holding in NLRB v. Industrial
Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers8 as the claims do concern
public policy questions, rather than internal union issues. In that case,
the Court pointedly said, "[i]f the member becomes exhausted, instead of
the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached ... "'-0
An examination of the structure and operation of rebate plans is beyond this paper. It is accurate to state that unions use a rebate standard
at variance with case law. Typically, such plans return monies for "partisan political or ideological purposes"'4' or "activities or causes primarily
34. 479 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 1973).
35. "Fair representation" is the duty of the union to represent all bargaining unit employees fairly, honestly and in good faith, and without malice or hostility. First established
in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), it is equated with "fiduciary" and
"agency" duties, the full application of which has not yet been found. See Beriault v. Local
40, Super Cargoes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. 533 F.2d 1126, 1130-32 (9th Cir. 1976). This Ninth Circuit decision is part of the
history on remand of the case cited in note 10 supra.
37. The court in Beck v. CWA, 468 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1980) says simply, "exhaustion would not promote settlement of the dispute and would cause unnecessary delay." Further, the court in Greenfield, 3 PUB. BARG. CAS. (CCH) at 37,932 states:
It has been held that employees, such as non-member teachers, are not bound
by the union-member contract to exhaust internal union appeals before resorting
to a judicial forum [citing Soto Segarra v. Sea-land Serv. Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 295
(1st Cir. 1978)]. Moreover, not even union members are required to exhaust internal union procedures in a case which concerns fundamental constitutional rights.
38. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., No. 70-15525 GC (Mich. Cir. Ct. August 16, 1978).
This result is contrary to the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals in Ball v. City of
Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978).
39. 391 U.S. 418, 428 (1968).
40. Id. at 425.
41.

CONST. OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,

art. IX, § 10 (1978).
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political in nature."' 2 The author has not seen any rebate plan that

utilizes the Abood "non-collective bargaining" standard. In general, these
rebates are used by unions to delay litigation, on the "exhaustion" theory,'" and not to provide full relief for asserted claims."
The first amendment determination in Abood raised a substantial
"prior restraint" issue the Court did not resolve. Mr. Justice Stevens filed
a separate concurring opinion solely to announce his concern for its importance. 4" Not all speech is first amendment protected." Determinations
must be made as to whether given speech is protected or unprotected."
The "prior restraint" concern is that protected speech will be suppressed,

or restrained, pending the outcomes of these determinations, for the
"value" of speech to the speaker or listener can be lost, at least temporarly, with simple lapse of time and, consequently, with attendant irrepara-

ble harm. In the context of the forced dues issue, the significance of the
"prior restraint" problem has been underscored by one knowledgeable
commentator: "political and ideological viewpoints once promulgated, and
political influence once applied, cannot be withdrawn from the marketplace of ideas, the legislative chamber, or the polling booth.'4 8 But, as

indicated, in-Abood, for reasons not explained, only Justice Stevens confronted the issue.

Subsequent public-sector forced dues cases have considered the "prior
restraint" aspect of the first amendment violations involved. One case,
brought by employee plaintiffs to contest the fee, resulted in an order for
the pendente lite escrow of the fee.4' In another case,"e brought by the
union against an employee to collect the fee, payment of the fee into the
42. 468 F. Supp. at 92 (Appendix; Partisan Politics Policy of the Communications Workers of America, adopted June 19, 1974).
43. The affidavit of Raymond J. LaJeunesse, filed with the Beck Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Defendant Communications Workers of America's Motion to Dismiss or Stay, served August
26, 1977 and on file with the court clerk, recites the invocation of one union's rebate in
October of 1974, with no conclusion of proceedings as of the date the affidavit was signed,
August 26, 1977.
44. Rebate checks were sent by CWA to plaintiffs in Beck, on September 12, 1977 for
$2.95 as the rebate for one year. See 468 F. Supp. at 91 n.8. As the appendices to the report
of the Special Master in Beck indicate, the plaintiffs' claims have considerably greater monetary value. 166 DAI.Y LABOR REPORT (BNA) D-1, D-17 (August 25, 1980) (Report of Special
Master for U.S. District Court for Maryland in Beck v. CWA).
45. 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949).
47. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
48. Merrill, Limitations Upon the Use of Compulsory Union Dues, 42 J. AIR L. & Com.
711, 772-73 (1976).
49. Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607, 613 (1978).
50. Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Stengren, No. 76-006456-C2, (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
filed May 7, 1976).
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escrow was ordered."' In yet another case, involving a form of interpleader action by an employer against the union and employees, the fees
were ordered to be paid into the registry of the court.51 These cases evidence considerable sensitivity to the "prior restraint" problem that the
Supreme Court in Abood ignored.
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks s was
filed between the Allen and Abood decisions. The case concerns the rights
of Western Airlines employees under Section 2, Eleventh " of the Railway
Labor Act. The claims against the union were framed on a "fair representation"5 theory, seeking relief from the union's non-bargaining spending.
The plaintiffs and the union filed cross motions for summary judgment.
The union's was denied. Plaintiffs' was granted as to liability. The court
held that the spending of dues and fees" for identified non-bargaining
activities violates the duty of fair representation.5 7
51.
.52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (Order of January 30, 1979).
Greenfield, supra note 26, at 37,933.
91 L.R.R.M. 2339, modified, 93 L.R.R.M. 2976 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1976).
The duty of fair representation is described more fully supra note 35.
The consolidated cases contain both union member and non-member plaintiffs.

57. 91 L.R.R.M. at 2343. Those activities in Ellis were:
(1) Recreational, social and entertainment expenses for activities not attended
by management personnel of Western Airlines.
(2) Operation of a death benefit program.
(3) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC among Western Airlines
bargaining unit employees.
(4) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC, and/or seeking collective
bargaining authority or recognition for:
(a) employees not employed by Western Airlines;
(b) employees not employed in the air transportation industry;
(c) employees not employed in other transportation industries.
(5) Publications in which substantial coverage is devoted to general news, recreational and social activities, political and legislative matters, and cartoons.
(6) Contributions to charities and individuals.
(7) Programs to provide insurance, and medical and legal services to the BRAC
membership, or portions thereof, other than such program secured for its salaried
officers and employees.
(8) Conducting and attending conventions of BRAC.
(9) Conducting and attending conventions of other organizations and/or labor
unions.
(10) Defense or prosecution of litigation not having as its subject matter the negotiation or administration of collective bargaining agreements or settlement or
adjustment of grievances or disputes of employees represented by BRAC.
(11) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending, or existing legislative
measures.
(12) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending, or existing governmental
executive orders, policies, or decisions. Id. at 2342.
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The damages aspect of the case was tried with the burden of proof assigned to the union. The union was not required to prove its collective
bargaining costs, but merely the costs of the non-bargaining activities."
The trial was non-jury, and the Judge's findings awarded the plaintiffs 40
percent of national union expenditures for the year 1976, and 37.8 percent in the year 1977, with nominal damages at the intermediate and local levels. 5 ' The case is on appeal to the United States Court of-Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit."
II.

GENERAL RELEvANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

An exhaustive survey of the constitutional principles relevant to the
kind of case under discussion is well beyond the scope of this paper.6" To
provide a framework for consideration of the Special Master's Report in
Beck," brief mention will be made of Supreme Court cases that establish
recognized principles. The Supreme Court has been extremely solicitous
of first amendment rights. The cases, which establish the required analysis in which the infringement of constitutional rights is at issue, are well
known. The precedents establish a right to speak and a right not to
speak.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette" set forth the
right to refrain from saluting the United States flag. Wooley v. Maynard" affirmed the right to decline to display the state's license plate
legend "live free or die." Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne" recognized the right to speak at a public forum. In cases that
concern the right to speak or the right to refrain from it, the decision is
achieved through a stringent analysis of the relation between the action
compelled or prevented and the governmental interest suppression is
claimed to serve. The analysis begins with determining whether the statute, regulation, or policy under scrutiny was designed or implemented to
suppress speech, or has some other purpose and incidentally impinges
58. Transcript of Proceedings at 4-5, Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship
Clerks, Nos. 73-113-N, 73-118-N (S.D. Cal., Nov. 15, 1976).
59. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, 88 Lab. Cas. 24,031-033
(1980) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).
60. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, No. 80-5603 (9th Cir. August 6, 1980).
61. See Vieira, Of Syndicalism, Slavery And The Thirteenth Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of "Exclusive Representation" In Public-Sector Employment, 12, WAKE FOREST L. REv. 515 (Fall, 1976).
62. See note 44 supra.
63. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
64. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
65. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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upon speech. In instances in which the effect upon speech was intended,
the Court has applied the "clear and present danger" test."6 In cases in
which the impact upon speech is an unintended byproduct of the statute,
the Court applies the "overbreadth-least restrictive
regulation, or policy,
67
alternative" test.

The quality and convincing character of the evidence required of the
party with the burden of proof in first amendment cases has received less
frequent attention than that concerning the "test" to be applied in the
first instance. Nonetheless, the kind of evidence required has been fixed
in first amendment jurisprudence. It requires that the party accorded the
burden of proof (generally the party seeking to impinge upon the constitutionally protected interest and affect freedom of speech) prevail only
upon presentation of "clear and convincing proof."es
III.

BECK V. COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS

Beck v. Communications Workers of America is the first private-sector
case to directly apply first amendment principles to the kind of case
under discussion. Plaintiffs in that case were subject to an agency shop
arrangement that the Bell System employer had with the Communications Workers.6 9 This arrangement was reached under color of section
8(a)(3) of the Act. The employees' obligation to the union (hereinafter
CWA) on the face of the arrangement was to pay CWA the equivalent to
70
dues.
66. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). That test is satisfied only if the speech
involved is directed to "inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
67. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972). In such cases, the
governmental purpose served by the activity, regulation, or statute is identified. Only the
means least restrictive upon speech can be used to implement it, and more expansive means
fail as overly-broad. As suggested at the outset, this appears to be the test the Court used in
Abood.
68. This test has been applied in first amendment civil cases in which "malice" is an
element of the plaintiff's proof in a defamation action. "Clear and convincing proof"' of malice is required to establish that the case is one of unprotected defamation, rather than one
of speech protected by the first amendment. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
30 (1971) (Brennan, J.); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
69. Article 4, Section 3 of the Agreement of July 18, 1974 between the parties provides:
Effective January 1, 1976, all employees except occasional employees shall become members of the Union or pay or tender to the Union amounts equal to periodic dues as a condition of employment except that this condition shall not apply
to employees who are hired or who enter the bargaining unit after December 1,
1975, until on or after the thirtieth day after such hire or entrance, whichever of
these dates is later, until the termination of this contract.
Successor agreements have essentially duplicate provisions.
70. 468 F. Supp. at 88.
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Plaintiffs' claims in Beck were asserted on statutory and first amendment grounds. In response, CWA put forth its rebate as a defense and
sought a stay or dismissal pending plaintiffs' exhaustion of it.7 1 The mo-

tion was denied on grounds that exhaustion would not assist in resolution
of the dispute and would cause unnecessary delay.72 The Court took the
existence of CWA's rebate as an admission of non-bargaining spending"8
and entered a judgment that the collection and spending of fees for such
purposes violates plaintiffs' first amendment rights.7 ' In doing so, the
Court adopted the Allen burden of proof and the Abood "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment" standard.75
With those parameters set for the course of the case, the Court referred
the matter to a7 6Special Master for recommended findings of fact and conclusion of law.

Plaintiffs anticipated CWA's claim that its activities, no matter what
their character, "benefitted" plaintiffs. The "benefit" concept is mentioned in Hanson.77 They, therefore, submitted interrogatories to CWA
addressed to the issue. CWA declined to answer them, and plaintiffs' subsequent motion to compel was denied.78 However, plaintiffs' motion in
limine, to prevent the injection of an issue for which discovery had been
denied, was granted.7 9 In effect, this precluded CWA from one argument
that is usually made without proof.80
Significant to the course of the case, a motion by CWA to prevent the
discovery of documents was denied.8 ' That order permitted plaintiffs to
assemble the documentary record described in the Special Master's Report."2 The discovery obtained revealed those activities in which CWA
engages." To catalogue them fully here is beyond the scope of this discussion. A partial list of discovered activities includes of course the negotia71. Motion of the Communications Workers of America to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings,
Beck v. CWA, No. B-76-839 (D. Md., served July 13, 1977).
72. 468 F. Supp. at 90.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Beck v. CWA, No. B-76-839 (D. Md., May 3, 1979) (order of reference to Special
Master).
77. See text accompanying note 7.
78. Beck v. CWA, No. B-76-839 (D. Md., Aug. 16, 1979) (Order denying motion).
79. 166 DAm.Y LABOR REPORT (BNA) D-1, D-2 (August 25, 1980) (Report of Special
Master for U.S. District Court for Maryland in Beck v. CWA).
80. See, Bradley, Constitutional Limits to Union Power (Council on American Affairs,
Washington, D.C., 1976).
81. Beck v. CWA, No. B-76-839 (D. Md., Aug. 16, 1979) (Order denying motion).
82. 166 DmLv LABOR REPORT (BNA) at D-2.
83. Id. The more than 2,000 exhibits mentioned are on file in the Office of the Clerk of
the District Court.
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tion of collective bargaining agreements, their administration, and the adjustment of grievances pursuant to their provisions.
However, and more to the point in first amendment analysis, because of
the bargaining/non-bargaining dichotomy, a listing also includes political
party activity of every kind and description, from influencing convention
delegate selection, through preparation of party platform content, to delegate management on the convention floor. Following the 1976 Democratic
Convention, the Beck evidence shows, CWA was active in voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, creation of the "presidential debates," the
design and distribution of campaign bumper stickers, and events for
union delegates at the Presidential Inauguration. Legislatively, CWA lobbies with respect to various items through "grassroots" campaigns and
utilization of its paid staff. These efforts have included such topics as
"labor law reform," situs picketing, deregulation of natural gas, minimum
wages, postcard voter registration, national health insurance, strip mining, food stamps, hospital cost containment, the observance of International Women's Year, the Clinch River breeder reactor, and copyright
revision.
CWA has also recommended people to the staffs of United States Senators, and for appointments to the office of United States Attorney General, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the United
States Census Bureau, the Environmental Protection Agency, the United
States Postal Service, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and
federal judgeships. It also has operating liaison with coalitions engaged in
"issue politics." These include the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse," ERAmerica, the A. Philip Randolph Institute," Concerned Seniors for Better Government, the Full Employment Action Council, the Coalition for
Progressive Tax Reform, the National Urban Coalition, the National Coalition for Lower Tuition in Higher Education, the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority.
On international issues, CWA lobbied for the SALT II Treaty, the Panama Canal Treaty, and the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe. It urged
support for "the tormented people of Northern Ireland," and the hostages
in Iran.
Based upon the record and argument, the Special Master found that
CWA expends 19 percent of its receipts from dues and agency fees for
"collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment." He found that 81 percent of dues and fees are "improperly
84. This organization functioned prior to the 1976 Democratic Convention to secure delegates favorable to the candidacy of Jimmy Carter.
85. "The broad goals of the Institute are the integration of society and the elimination of
poverty through full employment and social welfare programs." B. Rustin, Bayard Rustin
on Seniority, in [1975] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 194, 195.
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charged [to] the Agency Fee Payors." ' s In reaching this result, the Special
Master adopted the definition of "collective bargaining" from section 8(d)
of the Act, the statute that furnishes the basis for plaintiffs' obligation to
CWA and which provides that "to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement .... ,,7
In the Special Master's view, "expenditures not clearly embraced
within collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment, as defined, will only be permissible if such expenditure directly
relates to and is reasonably necessary for the proper effectuation of collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment.""
That definition is consistent with case law89 and commonly accepted
sources.90 It is a rejection of CWA's claim that "everything it does is collective bargaining."' 1 It is against this definition that the Special Master
assayed CWA's proof. He determined that collective bargaining activity
2
must be established by "clear and convincing evidence".
The 19 percent of CWA's expenditures held to meet the collective bargaining definition was derived by first classifying expenditures into four
categories: (1) permissible, that is, collective bargaining; (2) impermissible, that is, other than collective bargaining; (3) partly permissible, a
mixed class of expenditures apportioned into the first two categories; and
(4) a category used when proof of the nature of an activity or its associated cost is not "clear and convincing." Chargeable agency fees represent
the ratio that the total of permissible expenditures and the partly permissible expenditures allocated to the permissible category bears to the total
of all union expenditures. That ratio, converted to percent, is the 19 percent found by the Special Master."3 Based upon that ratio, the Special
Master recommended a return of 81 percent of plaintiffs' past paid fees
and a reduction of their future obligation to CWA by the same
86. 166 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) at D-12.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
88. 166 DAILY LABOR Rmowr (BNA) at D-4.
89. See United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877 (4th Cir. 1955),
cited in 166 DAILY LABOR REPOir (BNA) at D-4.
90. In Wm'mi's NEW COLLEGIAT DimoNARY 162 (7th Ed. 1979), collective bargaining
is defined as "negotiation between an employer and a union representative usu. on wages,
hours, and working conditions." This is referred to in 166 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) at D4.
91. CWA's lawyer is quoted in the Baltimore Sun, May 22, 1980, § A, at 9, col. 1 as
saying, "But we believe that everything we do is related to collective bargaining."
92. 166 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) at D-3.
93. Id. at D-12.
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percentage.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Beck represents the first private-sector case squarely applying time-tested first amendment principles. It applies those principles first to identify
the constitutionally correct definition of "collective bargaining," and,
then to define the quality of the evidence the union must introduce to
prevail. In those respects, Beck reacquaints us with the proposition expressed in Thomas v. Collins," that "[the] espousal of the cause of labor
is entitled to no higher constitutional protection than the espousal of any
other lawful cause."'9 It also reassures employees, regardless of their sector of employment, that under the first amendment, they need not "espouse labor's cause" by pure speech or financial support.

94.
95.

323 U.S. 516 (1945).
Id. at 538.

